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Defendant and Appellant. ) 
( Priority No. 2 
Comes now the appellant, the above-named natural mother, by and 
uhrough counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and, pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, hereby replies to the State of Utah's new matters set forth as follows: 
SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
(1) The State misstates and mis-argues the issues before this Court. 
The case at hand is not a sufficiency of the evidence case. Rather, this case appealed 
deals with issues of law. Surely only issues dealing with evidence and judge level 
decisions are being challenged on appeal. Nonetheless, the defendant has sufficiently 
addressed and mustered all of the facts for this Court to consider. 
(2) The defendant's conviction was unconstitutionally disproportionate 
to the alleged conduct. The defendant failed to commit a felony level offense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE IS MISTAKEN ABOUT THE ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
The State mistakenly argues that the defendant's appeal deals with the 
mustering of evidence as it deals with sufficiency of the juror verdict. That is not the 
issue on appeal. As a matter of law, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the State 
fails it's burden to prove each element of the offense. It is the judge duty to determine 
questions of law and the jury duty to determine questions of fact. In this action, the 
defendant has raised questions of law. The judge as the arbiter has the duty to 
determine the admissibility of evidence, before he hands the case over to the jury as the 
trier of fact. Moreover, only the judge-not the jury-makes conclusions of law. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-21-3 (1953, as amended) provides: 
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts 
preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings, 
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and all 
discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is by 
law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, 
who are bound to accept it. 
Id. In this matter, the defendant moved the court for a dismissal on the basis that the 
2 
State failed to meet it's burden of proof to establish each element of offense charged.1 
The defendant's motion was required the judge to conclude as a matter of law, whether 
the State proved each of the elements. State v. Ramirez,2 and State v. Nelson,3 both 
address the roles of the judge and jury, however, not quite on point with this action. 
These two cases addressed the issues of admissibility, where in this matter the 
defendant raises an issue dealing with a conclusion of law. Section 76-1-501 requires a 
determination that the prosecution has presented a prima facie case including all the 
elements of the offense-in this case a violation of Subsection 76-8-508(2). Upon the 
State's closing, the defense moved for a dismissal as the prosecution failed to establish 
that the defendant conveyed a thre-ii ilt il i "bodily ni|ui v "  I Jn . . none . . . zero 
evidence was presented in this matter dealing with a threat to do bodily injury. That is 
1
 Utah Code Ann. 76-1-501 (1953, as amended) provides: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, 
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but 
shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
2
 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 924 P.2d 366, (Court of Appeals, September 12, 1996). 
3
 333 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 950 P.2d 940 (Court of Appeals, December 26, 1997). 
3 
the issue on appeal. 
Moreover, the conviction absent proof that the defendant intended a threat 
to do bodily injury causes the conviction in this matter to be disproportionate. The 
defendant's threat does not amount to felonious conduct, rather the allegations better 
warrants a misdemeanor punishment. In State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997), the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Analogous to 
Gardner, the defendant claims that his felony conviction of the alleged offense is 
disproportionately cruel and unusual. The Gardner Court stated: 
We have held that the standard for cruel and unusual punishment claims in specific 
applications is "'"whether the sentence imposed in proportion to the offense committed 
is such as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper 
under the circumstances."'" Monson, 928 P.2d at 1024 (quoting State v. Russell, 791 
P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Bastian, 765 P.2d 902, 904 (Utah 
1988))); see also Andrews, 843 P.2d at 1030; State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 
1981); State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372, 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968). 
Id. In this matter, imprisonment is proportionately cruel under the circumstances. 
Absent any clear threat TO DO BODILY INJURY the threat actually conveyed is 
analogous to one associated with harassment or stalking-as previously argued. Clearly 
it is not proper and shocks the moral sense of any reasonable man to convicted a 
physically handicapped individual to prison for being obnoxious. It appears from the 
evidence presented that the defendant's intent to harass was accomplished and he did 
not actually intend to inflict bodily injury. At no time has the defendant every been 
convicted of any violent crimes that would reasonably lead one to believe that his 
intentions were to threaten bodily injury. Remember, Sherry Reeves fears were pre-
4 
existing the incident-as conceded by the State-because of the defendants lummox size 
and anti-social mannerisms. However, the defendant is as gentle as a child. Mr. 
Spainhower is prone to be inquisitive, easily confused, and repetitive just like a child. 
In order for the defendant's conduct to be felonious he needed to 
expressly convey a threat to do bodily injury or the conduct had to be a criminal act. 
Absent a criminal act or absent the actual threat to do bodily injury the defendant has 
not committed this felony offense. To aid this Court in understanding, the defendant 
points the Court to the well-established rules of statutory construction. 
As stated in State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah 
Court of Appeals commanded: 
Both Serpente and Kennedy relied upon statutory construction doctrine of 
ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, "of the same 
kind" and its companion of noscitur a sociis, "it is known from its 
associates," when general terms follow specific ones, the general terms 
must be restricted to a sense analogous to the preceding specific terms. 
Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989) (citing In re 
Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Utah 1983); 
see also Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 369-70, 374 P.2d 839, 840 
(1962). 
Id. Under these rules, the Court must harmonize it's different parts to understand the 
prohibited conduct. Doing so, will assist this Court in determining whether the conduct 
is constitutionally proportionate. Each subsection of 76-8-508 needs to be used to guide 
the Court's understanding what was intended and whether each of the elements were 
fully established properly at trial before the judge was to hand the case over 
5 
to the jury. In this matter, it is quite clear that the defendant had not committed a 
felony. The defendant's conviction of a felony was unconstitutionally disproportionate. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon a review of these issues for correctness, this Honorable Court to 
overturn both appeals as a matter of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of 
November, 1998. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 12th day of November, 
1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the 
counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class 
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of the Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0854. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 582 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
S e c 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1866 
Sec. 21 . [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 18* 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise 
privilege or immunity. 18* 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws.] 
All laws of a general na ture shall have uniform operation. 
18* 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impai 
or deny others retained by the people. **• 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory an 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to b 
otherwise. 18S 
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76-8-504. Written false statement. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He makes a written false statement which he 
does not believe to be true on or pursuant to a form 
bearing a notification authorized by law to the 
effect that false statements made therein are punis-
hable; or 
(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in the 
performance of his official function, he: 
(a) Makes any written false statement which he 
does not believe to be true; or 
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a 
written application for any pecuniary or other 
benefit by omitting information necessary to prevent 
statements therein from being misleading; or 
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing 
which he knows to be lacking in authenticity; or 
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample, 
specimen, m a p , boundary mark, or other object 
which he knows to be false. 
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if 
he retracts the falsification before it becomes man-
ifest that the falsification was or would be exposed. 
1973 
76-8-505. False or inconsistent statements • 
Proof of falsity of statements - Irregularities no 
defense. 
(1) On any prosecution for a violation of Subse-
ction 76-8-502 (1) or 76-8-503 OXa), falsity of 
a statement may not be established solely through 
contradiction by the testimony of a single witness. 
(2) In prosecutions for violation of Subsection 76-
8-502 (2) or 76-8-503 (1Kb), it need not be 
alleged or proved which of the statements are false 
but only that one or the other is false and not beli-
eved by the defendant to be t rue. 
(3) It is not a defense to a charge under this part 
that the oath or affirmation was administered or 
taken in an irregular manner . 1997 
76-8-506. Provision of false information to law 
enforcement officers, government agencies, or 
specified professionals. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(1) knowingly gives or causes to be given false 
information to any peace officer with a purpose of 
inducing the officer to believe that another has 
commit ted an offense; or 
(2) knowingly gives or causes to be given to any 
peace officer, any state or local government agency 
or personnel, or to any person licensed in this state 
t o practice social work, psychology, or marriage and 
family therapy, information concerning the comm-
ission of an offense, knowing that the offense did 
no t occur or knowing that he has no information 
relating to the offense or danger . 199s 
76-8-507. False personal information to peace 
officer. 
A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with 
intent of misleading a peace officer as to his iden-
tity, bir th da te , or place of residence, he knowingly 
gives a false name , bir th da te , or address to a peace 
officer in the lawful discharge of his official dudes . 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness - Retaliation 
against witness or informant - Bribery -
Communicating a threat. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to : 
(a) testify o r inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, docu-
76-8-51Q, 
19S3 
ment, item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide 
evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or inves-
tigation to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if 
he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for 
anything done by another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any 
benefit in consideration of his doing any of the acts 
specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a rea-
sonable person would believe to be a threat to do 
bodily injury to the person, because of any act 
performed or to be performed by the person in his 
capacity as a witness or informant in an official 
proceeding or investigation. lses 
76-8-508.5. Tampering with juror - Retaliation 
against jnror - Penalty. 
(1) As used in u i s section " juror" means a 
person: 
(a) summoned for jury duty; or 
(b) serving as or having served as a juror or alte-
rnate juror in any court or as a juror on any grand 
jury of the state. 
(2) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if 
he attempts to or actually influences a juror in the 
discharge of the juror ' s service by: 
(a) communicating with the juror by any means, 
directly or indirectly, except for attorneys in lawful 
discharge of their duties in open court; 
(b) offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer any 
benefit upon the juror; or 
(c) communicating to the juror a threat that a 
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to 
injure: 
(i) the juror ' s person or property; or 
(ii) the person or property of any other person in 
whose welfare the juror is interested. 
(3) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if 
he commits any unlawful act in retaliation for any-
thing done by the juror in the discharge of the 
juror ' s service: 
(a) to the ju ror ' s person or property; or 
(b) to the person or property of any other person 
in whose welfare the juror is interested. 
(4) Tampering with a juror is a third degree 
felony. 1992 
76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding. 
(1) A person is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree if by the use of force or by any threat which 
would constitute a means of committing the crime 
of theft by extortion under this code, if the threat 
were employed to obtain property, or by promise of 
any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts to 
induce an alleged victim of a crime to secure the 
dismissal of or to prevent the filing of a criminal 
complaint, indictment, or information. 
(2) " V i c t i m / as used in this section, includes a 
child or other person under the care or custody of a 
parent or guardian. 1973 
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence. 
A person commits a felony of the second degree 
if, believing that an official proceeding or investig-
ation is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything 
with a purpose to impair its verity or availability in 
the proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he 
C O D E - C O Utah Criminal and Traffic Code 481 
78-19-3 JUDICIAL CODE 556 
(b) the damage or injury was not caused by an inten-
tional or knowing act by the volunteer which constitutes 
illegal, willful, or wanton misconduct. 
(2) The protection against volunteer liability provided by 
this section does not apply: 
(a) to injuries resulting from a volunteer's operation of 
a motor vehicle, a vessel, aircraft or other vehicle for 
which a pilot or operator's license is required; 
(b) when a suit is brought by an authorized officer of a 
state or local government to enforce a federal, state, or 
local law; or 
(c) where the nonprofit organization for which the 
volunteer is working fails to provide a financially secure 
source of recovery for individuals who suffer injuries as a 
result of actions taken by the volunteer on behalf of the 
nonprofit organization. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall bar an action by a volun-
teer against an organization, its officers, or other persons who 
intentionally or knowingly misrepresent that a financially 
secure source of recovery does or will exist during a period 
when such a source does not or will not in fact exist. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to place a duty 
upon a nonprofit organization to .provide a financially secure 
source of recovery. 
(5) The granting of immunity from liability to a volunteer 
under this section shall have no effect on the liability of the 
nonprofit organization providing the financially secure source 
of recovery. 1990 
78-19-3. Liability protection for organizations. 
A nonprofit organization is not liable for the acts or omis-
sions of its volunteers in any circumstance where: 
(1) the acts of its volunteers are not as described in 
Subsection 78-19-2(1) unless the nonprofit organization 
had, or reasonably should have had, reasonable notice of 
the volunteer's unfitness to provide services to the non-
profit organization under circumstances that make the 
nonprofit organization's use of the volunteer reckless or 
wanton in light of that notice; or 
(2) a business employer would not be liable under the 
laws of this state if the act or omission were the act or 
omission of one of its employees. 1990 
CHAPTER 20 
RESERVED 
PART III 
PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 21 
ISSUES AND TRIAL 
Section 
78-21-1. Right to jury trial. 
78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact. 
78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law. 
78-21-1. Right to jury trial. 
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal 
property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as 
due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for 
injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury 
trial is waived or a reference is ordered. 1953 
78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact. 
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than 
those mentioned in Section 78-21-3, are to be decided by the 
jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed to them, 
except when otherwise provided. 1995 
78-21-3. Court to d e c i d e quest ions of law. 
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, 
the facts preliminary to such admission, the construction of 
statutes and other writings, and the application of the rules of 
evidence are to be decided by the court and all discussions of 
law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is by 
law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such 
knowledge to the jury, who are bound to accept it. 1953 
CHAPTER 22 
JUDGMENT 
Section 
78-22-1. Duration of judgment — Judgment as lien 
upon real property — Abstract of judgment 
— Small claims judgment not lien. 
78-22-1.1. Judgment against party dying after verdict or 
decision. 
78-22-1.5. Definitions — Judgment recorded in Registry 
of Judgments. 
78-22-2. Judgment against sheriff — When conclusive 
against sureties on indemnity bond. 
78-22-3. Judgment by confession authorized. 
78-22-4. Mileage allowance for judgment debtor re-
quired to appear. 
78-22-1. Duration of judgment — Judgment as lien 
upon real property — Abstract of judgment — 
Small claims judgment not lien. 
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previ-
ously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed 
in accordance with law. 
(2) Prior to July 1,1997, except as limited by Subsection (4), 
the entry of judgment by a district court is a lien upon the real 
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, 
owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, 
located in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
(3) Prior to and after July 1, 1997, an abstract of judgment 
issued by the court in which the judgment is entered may be 
recorded in any court of this state and shall have the same 
force and effect as a judgment entered in that court. 
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judg-
ment entered in the small claims division of any court shall 
not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to 
the civil division of the district court and recorded in accor-
dance with Subsection (3). 1998 
78-22-1.1. Judgment aga ins t party dying after verdict 
or decision. 
A judgment rendered where a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact, and before judgment, is not a 
lien on the real property of the deceased party, but is payable 
in the course of the administration of his estate. 1953 
78-22-1.5. Definitions — Judgment recorded in Regis-
try of Judgments. 
(1) For purposes of this section, "Registry of Judgments" 
means the index where a judgment shall be recorded and 
searchable by the name of the judgment debtor through 
electronic means or by tangible document. 
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment rendered or • 
recorded in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect 
the title to real property unless the judgment is recorded in 
the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the 
district court of the county in which the property is located. 
(3) In addition to the requirement of Subsection (2), any 
judgment that is recorded in the Registry of Judgments on or 
after September 1, 1998, shall include a separate information 
statement of the judgment creditor that contains: 
